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Abstract
Many studies of state politics hold that a governor's success
in his or her dealings with the state's legislature is at its
height during the executive's initial legislative session and then
decreases as the final year approaches.

The purpose of this paper

is to examine the validity of this generally accepted assumption.
This thesis tests the hypothesis that governor's serving out the
concluding year of their te:nn are lame ducks.

An

analysis of the

legislative passage and amendment rates of two Governors of
Virginia, Gerald Baliles (1986-1989) and L. Douglas Wilder (19901993), during their first and last years reveals that lame duck
theory is suspect.

Both of these executives achieved first and

last year passage and amendment percentages which were more
congruous than one might expect.

Other variables besides Governor

Baliles and·Wilder's time in office affected their ability to gain
the passage of their legislative proposals.

I certify that I have read this thesis and find that, in
scope and quality, it satisfies the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts.
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Lame Duck Theory l

Introduction
The foundations of lame duck theory, the expression connoting
the study of executive/legislative relations in association with
tenure constraints, are composed of broad generalizations which
are generally unchallenged by political scientists.

Evidence in

support of this assertion is scattered throughout relevant
literature, most of which centers upon the national executive, the
two-term limitation imposed by the Twenty Second Amendment, and
the subsequent lack of influence our country's presidents wield as
their "political capital dwindles" proportionate with the temporal
progress of their second term {Grossman, 1990, 221; see also
Cronin, 1975; Nice, 1986; and Thomas, 1988).

Interestingly, while

a great deal of time and energy has been devoted to the discussion
of the lame duck president,

11

very little has been done to analyze

systematically" the lame duck governor {Gross, 1989, 778; see also
Dometrius, 1987).

As such, "our understanding of the governor's

ability to influence legislative action and policy-making" as the
conclusion of his/her term approaches "remains highly speculative
and individualized." {Gross, 1989, 778; see also Schlesinger,
1972)
Theorists routinely adhere to the basic tenets of the lame
duck doctrine.

Many maintain that although one might expect

executives in the final year of their tenure to be more adept at
"building successful coalitions with the network of executive
departments, agencies" and legislatures due to the increased
amount of time they have served in off ice and their resulting
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familiarity with its intricacies, in reality all executives
experience "a kind of natural cycle, a decline in quality in the
twilight of the administration." {Grossman, 1990, 218-219; see
also Ransome, 1982)

As such, those who accept the doctrine's

tenets view the lame duck executive, defined as an individual
operating within the final year of his/her term who is
constitutionally restricted from seeking reelection, as being in a
less influential position.

They contend that executives are

victims of an evolutionary, cyclical process which, regardless of
their efforts, eventually restricts their resources and inhibits
their ability to "impose their will on .... the rest of the
political community in policy disputes." {Grossman, 1990, 226; see
also Ransome, 1982; and Schlesinger, 1972)

Thus, the lame duck

executive may be politically impotent, for limited tenure
presumably reduces the executive's leverage over other politicians
as their "resources for bargaining and coalition building" wane
{Thomas, 1988, 501).
This project, while not the first to question the soundness
of lame duck theory, makes an important contribution by providing
a systematic analysis of lame duck theory at the state leve1.1

By

analyzing the executive success rates, defined as the ability of
the head of state to initiate and gain the passage of their
i:

Beyle, 1983; crew, 1992; Dometrius, 1987; Gross, 1989; Jewell, 1972; and
Sigleman & Dometrius, 1988, have corrunented on the notion that there are
many variables to consider if one is attempting to investigate
gubernatorial/legislative relations in general. Also, Steven D. Johnson
(1990) noted that former Virginia Governor Chuck Robb's effectiveness
increased as his term progressed. But none of the above attempt to
evaluate systematically the effects of the variables analyzed here
during the governor's final year in office.
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executive package,2 of two of Virginia's recent Governors, Gerald
Baliles (1986-1989) and L. Douglas Wilder (1990-1993), I will
attempt to illustrate that an executive's success in his or her
dealings with the state legislature toward the end of their tenure
is not wholly dependent upon the electoral limitations and the
executive's lame duck status (Jewell, 1972)

.3

Rather, it is

hypothesized that despite the constraints cited in lame duck
theory, during a governor's final year in office executive success
still hinges on other critical variables associated with
executive/legislative relations: the governor's future ambitions,
personality traits and leadership skills, and the political
environment - the fiscal situation, the executive's agenda,
gubernatorial popularity, electoral results, and the partisan
arrangement of the legislature.

2:

3,

The executive package consists of the bills formally introduced into the
legislature by the governor and those agencies and departments under his
direct control and supervision.
As I point out further along in the thesis, "success" can be defined in a
variety of ways. Yet the controversy over the term does not undermine
the conception offered here. While my definition may be challenged on
the grounds that not all aspects of the executive package are equally
important, it does include the most extensive set of items in the
executive package and I do break down the package by issue area to
enrich the analysis. So, while no single conception of "success" is
absolute, my definition is legitimate for the purpose of testing the
lame duck hypothesis.
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Lame Duck Theo:r::y
The decentralization movement fostered under Presidents
Reagan and Bush resulted in the displacement of the federal
government as the primary policy-maker on a host of domestic
issues {Rosenthal, 1990).

Consequently, states were forced to

assume a greater portion of the burdens previously attended to by
their national counterpart.

While most states vigorously accepted

this responsibility, becoming the new "locus of initiatives in
education, public welfare, the environment, growth management and
other areas," those who adhere to lame duck theory doubt the
ability of an executive serving out their final year to operate
effectively within this new arena {Rosenthal, 1990, 1).

One study

that takes this view wonders if outgoing governors are equipped
with the power and resources necessary to establish "policies
which govern the day to day operations of the executive
branch .... secure policy coordination among the agencies which make
up the executive branch .... and assume formerly national
responsibilities {Ransome, 1982, 171).
Not surprisingly, those who accept lame duck theory are quick
to answer the above inquiries negatively.

Their disconsolate

assertions are(usually of the ensuing variety:
It would seem that the four year term with no bar to
succession •... would give the governor a boost in his role in policy
formation. The governor needs to stay in off ice for more than four
years primarily so that he can build a legislative bloc to support his
program. His power is generally at its height during the first
legislative session but tends to go downhill in subsequent sessions in
those states where the governor cannot succeed himself. However, if
there is a strong possibility that the governor may succeed himself,
legislators tend to pay more attention to the governor's program and to
be more receptive to his viewpoint (Ransome, 1982, 170-171).
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Interestingly, it is not difficult to isolate the generalizations
presented as fact. When Ransome says that "the governor needs to
stay in off ice for four more years primarily so that he can build
a legislative bloc to support his program," he ignores
an assortment of variables which influence the
executive/legislative relationship.

These unexplored factors

include whether the proposed program is controversial, the
legislative strength of the governor's party, whether the package
has tendered public support and publicity, and/or the executive's
persuasive and leadership abilities.

While not exhaustive, this

catalog of variables reveals the limitations of lame duck theory:
it rests on isolated suppositions dependent on the amount of time
spent in off ice rather than a host of other pertinent variables
which effect gubernatorial/legislative relations.
Scholars of state politics have begun to question the
soundness of theories which disregard a wide array of applicable
factors (Crew, 1992; Demetrius, 1987; Gross, 1989; and Sigleman &
Demetrius, 1988).

Many acknowledge that as the electorate

increasingly turns its eyes inward and calls upon the states to
meet the demands neglected by the national government, the status
and obligations of the states will continue to increase.
Consequently, the competence and skill of governors and
legislators deserve more attention in analyses of
executive/legislative relations.

As such, now is the time for

analyses which question simple theories and off er alternative
explanations of gubernatorial/legislative relations.

"The point
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seems very simple.

If we do not consider such infonnation •... we

simply cannot systematically evaluate" executive success (Gross,
1989, 780).
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Lame Duck Theory and Virginia's Governors
Virginia's governors operate within the confines of a singleterm rule which precludes them from inunediately succeeding
themselves. 4

This fact makes Virginia an appropriate state to

examine if one seeks to investigate the limitations of lame duck
theory.

Furthermore, since the formal powers afforded the

executive and legislative branches are roughly balanced, the
conclusions derived from this study have wider application to
states where the executive, while not confined to a single-term,
confronts an equally empowered legislature, is limited to two
successive terms and/or announces that he/she will not be seeking
reelection prior to the conclusion of his/her tenure.s

Those who

agree with lame duck theory would claim that the one term limit
without the possibility of succession would certainly result in
the continual decline of the governor's success rates.

We turn

now to two specific cases, Gerald Baliles and L. Douglas Wilder,
to test the validity of the lame duck hypothesis.6
Governor Gerald Baliles, 1986-1989

In 1985, Virginia's Democratic party "constructed a precedent4:

Kentucky also limits its governors to a single-term.

s:

Alan Rosenthal's characterization of the Virginia political scene sums up
the governmental symmetry of the legislative and executive branches:
"the governor .•.. is institutionally strong, partly because Virginia's
political culture is a deferential one, with considerable respect
accorded to the chief executive. Yet Virginia's political elites have a
keen sense of institutional boundaries, so the legislature can reign in
its domain while the governor reigns in the executive domain. For the
most part, lines are not crossed, and power is wielded subtly and shared
amicably between the two branches." (Rosenthal, 1990, 197-198)
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breaking, historic ticket that for the first time included a black
and a woman" (Sabata, 1987, 6l).

Led by Gerald Baliles (the

previous administration's Attorney General), L. Douglas Wilder and
Mary Sue Terry, the Democrats hoped to gain their second straight
sweep of the three statewide offices - governor, lieutenant
governor and attorney general.

The recurring question was whether

the "Old Dominion" was prepared to support such a revolutionary
move.
When the ballots were tallied, Baliles had received 55.2% of
the votes cast, and became the "first gubernatorial candidate
since Democrat Albertis

s. Harrison in l96l to carry all ten

congressional districts." (Sabata, 1987, 71)

His running mates,

having "wrapped themselves in traditional Virginia
values .... conducted sedate and subdued campaigns .... and embraced
the moderate-conservatism of .... their ticket leader," secured the
Democratic sweep, with Douglas Wilder and Mary Sue Terry capturing
5l.8% and 61.4% of the vote respectively (Sabata, 1987, 102).
These results signaled the "coming of age of the new Democratic
party of Virginia - a moderate party forged in the wilderness of
twelve fruitless years, a party that has turned away from liberal
extremes and toward centrism, a party that once again is whole and
financially healthy rather than splintered and broke." {Sabata,
1987, l07)
6:

This examination will compare the governor's first and last years in office
because most who adhere to the lame duck doctrine also feel that the
initial year ought to coincide with the executive's strongest
legislative showing. Consequently, if lame duck theory is verifiable,
the first and last year executive success rates should be highly
disparate.
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Buoyed by these electoral successes, the state's advantageous
fiscal situation and the priceless endorsement of party favorite
and gubernatorial predecessor Charles S. Robb, Governor Baliles
seemed poised for a highly successful first year in office.7

Add

to the favorable political environment a 2 to l Democrat advantage
in the House of Delegates and a 4 to l margin in the state Senate,
and one would expect Governor Baliles to pass the bulk of his
executive package.
Tables l and 2 document his impressive performance. In 1986,
Baliles' first year as Governor, the executive package consisted
of 118 bills, of which 82 were introduced in the House of
Delegates and 36 into the Senate.

He lost only 4.24% [5] of his

package either to continuation of the legislation to the 1987
session or death on the Assembly floor.

Further, fewer than half

of the bills were amended [58] while only 18.6% [22] were altered
by both houses.a

The most volatile portion of the package proved

to be the 39 Human Resource bills, initiatives which account for a
large portion (19.5%/23) of the governor's total amendment rate
(49.2%/58).

With most governors deemed successful if their

passage rate approaches 80.0% (Rosenthal, 1990, 113), Governor
Baliles' 95.8% rate confirms that 1986 was a good year for
executive/legislative relations in Virginia, with a minimum amount
of bills being killed or continued while few proposals were
seriously amended.9
Baliles' final year in office (1989), in contrast to 1986,
7:

Virginia's general fund budget increased by 10% for the fourth straight
year (Harris & Tapscott, 1992).
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- Table l: Governor Gerald Baliles, 1986 Legislative Session:
Passage Rate: 95.76%

I

Amendment Rate: 49.2%

*Total Number of Bills Introduced:
*Number Introduced into the House of Delegates:
*Number Introduced into the State Senate:
*Number of Duplicate Bills:
House
- Number of Bills
Amended in House
of Origin Only
- Number of Bills
Amended in Second
House Only

21 I 25.6%

4 I 4.90%

Senate
4 I ii.1%

1

I 19. 4%

9 I 25.0%

118
82
36
O

Totals
25 I 2i.2%

11

I 9.32%

- Number of Bills
Amended in Both
Houses Only

13 I 15.9%

- Number of Bills
Killed

2 I 2.44%

o I

0.00%

2 I 1.69%

- Number of Bills
Continued

3 I 3.66%

o I

0.00%

3 I 2.54%

- Total Number of
Bills Amended®

38 I 46.3%

20 I 55.6%

58 I 49.2%

®:

22 I 18.6%

Total Number Amended calculated by adding the first three lines.
Source: 1986 Legislative Session Documents, Division of Legislative
Services Library

a: The tables account for the total number of amended bills, not the total

number of amendments.
This proved to be a reliable measure of
legislative activity, for the total number of amendments for the four
years surveyed was 240, only 11 greater than the total number of amended
bills [229) .
9:

Following the 1986 legislative session, Governor Baliles achieved what many
observers believe to be his greatest legacy.
In a special legislative
session held in October, 1986, the governor was able to push through
record tax increases to pay for a mammoth road building plan (12-year,
$12 billion construction program) which ended the state's antiquated
11 pay-as-you-go 11
financing of roads, bringing the "'New Dominion• up to
speed" (Melton, January 15, 1989, Bl). This was the zenith point of the
highly successful first year.
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-Table 2:
:Governor Baliles, 1986 Legislative Session:
*Breakdown of Executive Package:
Number of
Bille
Amended in
House of
Origin only

Number of
Bille
Amended in
Second House
only

Number of
Bille
Amended in
Both
Houses only

Number of
Bille
Killed or
Continued

Total
Number of
Bille
Amended 111

Trane. & Public
Safety (40 Bille)

8.47%
(10)

0.00%
(0)

5.10%
(6)

3.39%
(4)

13.6%
(16)

Human Resources
(39 Bille)

5. 93%
(7)

5.93%
(7)

7.63%

0.85%
(1)

19. 5%
( 2 3)

Commerce & Trade
(17 Bille)

3.39%
(4)

0.85%
(1)

1.69%
(2)

0.00%
(0)

5.93%
(7)

Administration
(10 Bille)

2.54%
(3)

0.85%
(1)

2.54%
(3)

0.00%
(O)

5.93%
(7)

Finance
(7 Bille)

0.85%
(1)

0.85%
(1)

0.00%
(0)

0.00%
(0)

1.69%
(2)

Education
(5 Bille)

0.00%
(0)

0.85%
(1)

1.69%
(2)

0.00%
(0)

2.54%
(3)

Total: 21. 2%
(25)

9.32%

18.6%
(22)

4.24%

49.2%
(58)

®:

(11)

(9)

(5)

Totals Calculated by Adding Number of Bills Amended in House of Origin
Only, Second House Only and Both Houses Only
Source: 1986 Legislative Session Documents, Division of Legislative
Services Library

was a year in which the lofty expenditures associated with the
1980's led Virginia and the rest of the country to the brink of
an economic downturn.

The state's annual 10% budget increase came

to a halt and personal income for married couples declined by over
2%, the first drop since 1983 and the biggest since 1979 (Harris &
Tapscott, 1992)
io:

.10

These economic indicators did not bode well for

The 89'-90' Budget, drafted in the fall of 1988, showed a slight 4.0%
increase in Virginia's general fund budget. In contrast, the prior
Budget, drafted in the fall of 1987, depicted a 17.0% increase for the
88'-89' fiscal year (Va. Department of Taxation, Tax Policy Section).

Lame Duck Theory 12

Governor Baliles' chances of expanding his agenda in the upcoming
legislative session:
When times are good and revenues are mounting governors have the wherewithal to propose far reaching policy agendas .... when times are bad and
revenues are in decline .•.. they must focus substantial energies on
coping with economic crisis. The amount of fiscal resources available,
in short, forces governors to set priorities and also constrains their
ambitions (Rosenthal, 1990, 99).

Thus, even though he still maintained a 2 to l Democrat to
Republican advantage in the House of Delegates and a 3 to l margin
in the Senate, according to a member of Baliles' staff, the
inauspicious economic climate

11

was somewhat of a concern. For the

first time, we felt as if our capital resources were limited.
These indicators dictated that we restrict our ambitions and
narrow our agenda. "ll (Staff Interview, 4/13/94)
Tables 3, 4 and 5 indicate that despite the fiscal
constraints, and contrary to what lame duck theory would have us
believe, Governor Baliles did not experience a significant
reduction in his ability to gain legislative support of his
executive package.

Tables 3 and 4, akin to Tables l and 2, show

that 97.14% [68] of the bills introduced by the governor were
passed.

Meanwhile, the amendment rate actually declined from

49.2% [58] in 1986, to 47.1% [33] in 1989.
Table 5 charts the success of the governor's Finance and
Appropriations proposals highlighted in Table 4. To summarize, in
an attempt to give localities more revenue options, the governor
submitted a package which allowed local governments to impose an
u, Some of the material contained within this work was obtained by the author
in interviews with two former Deputy Secretarys, two members of both
Gerald Baliles• and L. Douglas Wilder's administrative staff and a high
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-Table 3: Governor Gerald Baliles, 1989 Legislative Session:
Passage Rate: 97.14%

I

Amendment Rate: 47.1%

*Total Number of Bills Introduced:
*Number Introduced into the House of Delegates:
*Number Introduced into the State Senate:
*Number of Duplicate Bills:
Senate

House

70
49
21

7

Totals

10

I 20.4%

2

I 9.52%

12

I 17.1%

- Number of Bills
Amended in Second
House Only

3

I 6.12%

5

I 23.8%

8

I 11.4%

- Number of Bills
Amended in Both
Houses Only

9

I 18.4%

4

I 19.0%

13

I 18.6%

- Number of Bills
Killed

3

I 6.12%

2

I 9.52%

2

- Number of Bills
Continued

o I

- Number of Bills
Amended in House
of Origin Only

- Total Number of
Bills Amended®
®:

22

0.00%

I 44.9%

o I
11

0.00%

I 52.4%

I 2.86%®

o I
33

0.00%

I 47 .1%

Total Number Amended calculated by adding the first three lines.

®: Number Decreases Because of Surviving Duplicate Bills
Source: 1989 Legislative Session Documents, Division of Legislative
Services Library

income tax to finance future transportation expenditures.

This

unusual and politically risky gambit sparked many partisan and
nonpartisan debates (Staff Interview, 9/13/93).

But in the end,

this initiative, while amended somewhat extensively (64.7%/11),
achieved a passage rate of 100.0%.
11: ranking member of the Department of Planning and Budget's Legislative

services branch. Hereinafter, these are referred to as "Staff
Interviews" followed by the date on which they were conducted.
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- Table 4:
:Governor Baliles, 1989 Legislative Session:
*Breakdown of Executive Package:
Number of
Bills
Amended in
House of
Origin Only

Number of
Bills
Amended in
Second House
Only

Number of
Bills
Amended in
Both
Houses Only

Number of
Bills
Killed or
Continued

Total
Number of
Bills
Amended"

Finance & Appropriations (17 Bills)

8.57%

4..30%

2.86%

(6)

(3)

(2)

4.30%
(3)

15.7%
( 11)

Health & Human
Resources (17 Bills)

2.86%

1.43%

4.30%

0.00%

8.57%

(2)

( 1)

(3)

(0)

(6)

Trans. & Public
Safety (16 Bills)

2.86%

1.43%
(1)

4.30%

2.86%

8.57%

(2)

(3)

(2)

(6)

Economic Development (9 Bills)

0.00%

1.43%

4.30%

0.00%

5.71%

(0)

{l)

(3)

(0)

{4)

Natural Resources
(7 Bills)

2.86%

1.43%
(1)

1.43%

0.00%

5.71%

(2)

{l)

(0)

(4)

Administration
(3 Bills)

0.00%

0.00%
(0)

1.43%
(1)

0.00%

(0)

1.43%
(1)

Education
(1 Bill)

0.00%

1.43%
(1)

0.00%

0.00%

(0)

(0)

11.4%

18.6%
(13)

(0)

Total: 17.1%
(12)

(8)

(0)

2.86%*
(2)

1.43%
(1)

47 .1%
(33)

Totals Calculated by Adding Number of Bills Amended in House of Origin
Only, Second House Only and Both Houses Only
*: Number Decreases Because of Surviving Duplicate Bills
source: 1989 Legislative Session Documents, Division of Legislative
Services Library

®:

These legislative tallies indicate that Governor Baliles did
not experience a discernable abatement of executive success during
the interim between his first and last years in off ice.

While the

1989 executive package contained 40.7% fewer bills than the 1986
proposal, a decline attributed to the pessimistic fiscal
forecast and the fact that "he (Baliles) J.lad introduced all the
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- Table 5: Governor Baliles, 1989 Finance & Appropriations Package:
Passage Rate: 100.0%

I

Amendment Rate: 64.7%

*TOtal Number of Bills Introduced:
*Number Introduced into the House of Delegates:
*Number Introduced into the State senate:
*Number of Duplicate Bills:
senate

House

17
10
7
7

Totals

- Number of Bills
Amended in House
of Origin Only

4

I 40.0%

2 I 20.6%

6 I 35.3%

- Number of Bills
Amended in Second
House Only

l I l0.0%

2 I 20.6%

3 I 17.6%

- Number of Bills
Amended in Both
Houses Only

2 I 20.0%

oI

2

- Number of Bills
Killed

2 I 20.0%

l

- Number of Bills
Continued

o I

0.00%

oI

- Total Number -of
Bills Amended®

1

I

10.0%

4

0.00%

I 14.3%
0.00%

I s1.1%

I ll.8%

o I 0.00%®

o I
11

0.00%

I 64.7%

®: TOtal Number Amended calculated by adding the first three lines.

®: Number Decreases Because of Surviving Duplicate Bills
Source: 1989 Legislative Session Documents, Division of Legislative
Services Library

legislation he deemed necessary, especially with it being a short
legislative session," the executive success rates were virtually
equal (Staff Interview, 9/13/93)

.12

Further, the passage and

amendment percentages of the most contested issues of 1986 and
1989, the Human Resources and Finance and Appropriations packages
respectively, were also analogous. The Human Resource bills
i2:

In odd calendar years, Virginia's legislative session is restricted to
thirty calendar days.
In even-numbered years, the legislative session
is 60 calendar days. Both may be extended by another thirty days.
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garnished a 97.44% passage rate and a 59.0% amendment rate, while
the Finance and Appropriations package attained a 100.0% passage
rate and a 64.7% amendment rate.
Now, an analysis of Governor Baliles' final year would be
incomplete if it failed to note the negative portrayal it received
in the media.

First, local journalists routinely questioned the

legislative achievements of Governor Baliles, reporting that a
number of amendments to the Finance and .Appropriations proposals
drastically altered their effect.13 Also, in March, 1989, "the
Supreme Court ruled that states must apply the same tax rules to
federal pensions, which Virginia had been taxing, and state
pensions, which it had not." (Baker, 1989, Bl)

The ruling, which

prevented states from taxing federal pensions if they did not
treat other government retirees identically, "scuttled Virginia's
pension-tax system." (Hardy, 1990, Al)

This development caught

the governor by surprise, forcing him to call a special
legislative session in the fall of 1989.

Unlike the preconceived

and highly anticipated 1986 gathering, the reports of most
journalists concluded that this special session ended in failure
for the governor.

In response, two former Deputy Secretary's

challenged the conclusions of reporters.
13:

Amendments differ in the extent to which they alter the thrust and meaning
of particular pieces of legislation. It is possible that some
amendments do not affect the letter or spirit of a governor's particular
legislative proposals, but certainly other amendments can cause dramatic
changes. Governors can have proposals passed into law, but if those
proposals are amended to the point where the governor's intent is
damaged or lost altogether, can the proposal's passage truly be labeled
a success for the governor? Queries like these lend credence to the
assertion that executive success might be defined in a variety of ways.
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The setbacks during the final special session were traceable to the
fact that the problems which were dealt with were unexpected and
somewhat unprecedented. The impetus for it came from outside the state
and, because of the Court's penchant for time consumption, an early
decision was not expected. The lack of forewarning caught both the
governor and the state's legislators off-guard, and since neither knew
exactly how to deal with the dilermna, a perceived •failure• was
imminent. In reality though, the agreed upon solution was full of
compromises more so than failures (Staff Interview, 10/1/93) •
While the majority of the local media may have been less impressed
with the •successes• of 1989, others broadened their field of vision,
looked at the entire package and the atypical conditions surrounding the
special session, and, consequently, portrayed our accomplishments in a
more favorable light. The governor's office took that view and,
when the dust settled, genuinely felt that while the 89' session was
both a challenge and, at times, distressing, in the end, it was,
overall, a •successful' experience. Even when one focuses on the
amendments to the transportation sections of the appropriations bills,
while the Assembly struck a blow by adding the requirement that the
local voters would have to app~ove the levy, we (Governor Baliles and
his staff) were OK with this because we knew that the very real
possibility of a recession made the passage of a package calling for the
mandatory imposition of another statewide tax a political impossibility.
It was this, and not Baliles• 'lame duck' status, which forced us to
accept the bills as amended in the Assembly. So, it's evident that
•success• is a subjective term, largely defined by one's outlook,
perspective and the criteria upon which conclusions are based (Staff
Interview, 12/ 12/93) •

The conflicting interpretations offered above illustrate the
chief difficulty associated with defining executive success: while
each view warrants consideration, it is impossible to detennine
whether one supersedes the other.

Yet, neither suggests that the

governor's power declined because his tenn was approaching its
conclusion.

Thus, while the results of the 1989 session lend

themselves to conflictual_ interpretations, it still appears that
Governor Baliles confronted his final year and defied the tenure
constraints allied against him.

As

such, it would be appropriate

for one to ask how Governor Baliles was able to maintain his
success percentages during his final session?

Could enabling
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variables, if skillfully implemented, empower an executive and
pe:anit him or her to overcome the limitations of the electoral
cycle?

These queries will be explored after we review Governor

Wilder's record.
Governor L. Douglas Wilder, 1990-1993

In 1985, L. Douglas Wilder campaigned for the position of
Lieutenant Governor "not as a Jesse Jackson, concentrating his
time and energy on the black community, but rather as
a .... mainstream black candidate widely acceptable to whites."
{Sabata, 1987, 84)

In doing so, he was able to capture seven of

ten congressional districts and 51.8% of the votes cast in spite
of his many liabilities:
His race, his liberal record on many social issues during fifteen years
in the State Senate, and his personal problems (including a reprimand by
the State Supreme Court for poor representation of a client, repeated
late payment of taxes, and building code violations on some of his
Richmond property) . Resentment also lingered in some quarters of the
Democratic party because of his threat to bolt the party and run as an
independent for the U.S. Senate in 1982 (Sabato, 1987, 104).

Douglas Wilder's 1989 campaign for the governorship mirrored
this previous effort.

Unopposed for the position in his own

party, Wilder's nomination still caused concern from "moderateconservative Democrats who were uneasy about the prospect.
Wilder's continuing family feud with fo:aner Governor Charles Robb
and his frequent disagreements with Governor Gerald Baliles only
increased their anxiety." {Sabata, 1991, 62)

But as the election

drew near, the Democratic party rallied around their candidate,
helping him to win the closest gubernatorial election of this
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century by a mere .30% (or a total of 50.1% of the vote).

Thus,

although Governor Wilder was "beautifully positioned for battle:
he was unopposed for the nomination, enjoyed the support of a
united party reconciled to his run, was well financed, reigned as
heir apparent to two popular administrations, won the
preponderance of editorial endorsements, and ran a shrewd
campaign .... he barely won." (Sabata, 1991, 100)
Once in office, Governor Wilder viewed his initial
legislative session with a modicum of apprehension.

While he

enjoyed the benefits of first year executive status and a partisan
advantage of 59 Democrats to 39 Republicans in the House of
Delegates and 30 Democrats to 10 Republicans in the senate, his
narrow electoral victory and lack of vigorous intra-party support
showed that he did not command the same level of deference
afforded his Democratic predecessor.

Furthermore, the state's

fiscal situation continued to decline.

In 1990, Virginia

experienced its first decrease in the general fund budget in ten
years and the elimination of 40,200 private sector jobs.
Consequently, when he came into office in January of 1990,
Governor Wilder acknowledged that the state needed to "bite the
bullet" and institute "substantial budgetary cuts" geared
towards rationalizing and scaling back the expenditure advances
made during the Robb-Baliles years (Slipek, 1990, 16; see also
Harris & Tapscott, 1992; and Morris, 1992).

He focused his

initial legislative agenda accordingly.
Tables 6 and 7 document his 1990 perfonnance.

While his
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- Table 6: Governor L. Douglas Wilder, 1990 Legislative Session:
Passage Rate: 94.26%

I

Amendment Rate: 55.7%

*Total Number of Bills Introduced:
*Number Introduced into the House of Delegates:
*Number Introduced into the State senate:
*Number of Duplicate Bills:
Senate

House

122
69
53
12

Totals

23

I

33.3%

lo

I

18.7%

33

I

27. 0%

- Number of Bills
Amended in Second
House Only

6

I

8. 70%

8

I

15.1%

14

I

11.5%

- Number of Bills
Amended in Both
Houses Only

8

I

ll. 6%

13

I

24.5%

21

I

17.2%

- Number of Bills
Killed

2

I

2.90%

6

I

ll.3%

5

I

4.10%®

- Number of Bills
Continued

l

I

1.45%

l

I

l.89%

2

I

l.64%

- Total Number of
Bills Amended®

37

I

55.2%

31

I

58.5%

68

I

55.7%

- Number of Bills
Amended in House
of Origin Only

®: Total Number Amended calculated by adding the first three lines.

®: Number Decreases Because of Surviving Duplicate Bills
source: 1990 Legislative Session Documents, Division of Legislative
Services Library

percentage of bills amended (55.7%/68) exceeded the 49.2% (58]
posted by Governor Baliles in 1986, the new governor still
achieved a 94.26% (115] passage rate.

Included within this

executive package were 28 Finance bills aimed at drastically
reducing Virginia's $181 million revenue short fall and the
subsequent creation of a moneta:ry reserve.

As

the economy slowed

and personal income dropped, partisan rhetoric grew more heated
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- Table 7:
:Governor Wilder, 1990 Legislative Session:
*Breakdown of Executive Package:
Number of
Bille
Amended in
House of
Origin Only

Number of
Bille
Amended in
Second House
Only

Number of
Bille
Amended in
Both
Houses Only

Number of
Bille
Killed or
Continued

Total
Number of
Bille
Amended@

Trane. & Public
Safety (32 Bills)

8.20%
(10)

2.46%

2.46%

1.64%

(3)

(3)

(2)

13.1%
(16)

Finance
(28 Bille)

7.38%

2.46%

5.74%

2.46%

( 9}

(3)

(7)

(3)

Econanic Development (27 Bille)

7.38%

1.64%

2.46%

(9)

(2)

(3)

0.82%
(1)

ll.5%
(14)

Health & Human
Resources (17 Bille)

3.28%

1.64%

4.10%

0.00%

(4)

(2)

(5)

(0)

9.02%
(ll)

Natural Resources
(10 Bille)

0.82%
(1)

0.82%
(1)

2.46%

0.82%
(1)

4.10%

(3)

Administration
(5 Bille)

0.00%

1.64%

0.00%

2.46%

1.64%

(0)

(2)

(0)

(3)

(2)

Education
(3 Bille)

0.00%

0.82%

0.00%

0.00%

0.82%

(0)

(1)

(0)

(0)

(1)

ll.5%
(14)

17 .2%

Total: 27 • O%
(33)

(21)

5.74%*
(7)

15.6%
(19)

(5)

55.7%
(68)

Totals Calculated by Adding Number of Bills Amended in House of Origin,
Second House Only and Both Houses Only
*: Number Decreases Because of Surviving Duplicate Bills
Source: 1989 Legislative Session Documents, Division of Legislative
Services Library

®:

and the importance of these measures grew (Hardy, 1990).

The

analysis showed that of the 28 bills, while 67.9% [19] were
amended, the package was passed in full.

Therefore, Governor

Wilder's first year, and presumably his strongest, saw the
attainment of an enviable passage percentage but a less favorable
amendment rate.
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Wilder's final legislative session (1993), bore witness to
yet another Virginia governor choosing his last year in off ice to
introduce into the Assembly controversial legislation.

Governor

Wilder incorporated a 14 point Violent Crime initiative into the
127 bills comprising his executive package.

Two of the 14 bills,

HB 1592 and SB 670, (duplicate bills which recommended that
individuals be restricted to the purchase of one hand gun per
month), attracted national attention and media coverage.

As the

lobbyists for the National Rifle Association (NRA} swung into
action, the 1993 session promised to play host to numerous
political debates and battles.
Tables 8, 9 and 10 map the fallout.

Interestingly, when the

executive's package is viewed in full {Tables 8 and 9), one again
notices that while Governor Wilder's amendment rate (55.1%/70)
exceeds the percentage posted by his predecessor, it is within
0.6% of Governor Wilder's 1990 amendment rate (55.7%/68).

Also,

his passage rate still hovers slightly above 90.0% (90.6%/115), a
proportion which many governors would treasure (Rosenthal, 1990).
Lastly, Table 10 examines the governor's Violent Crime
package.

Though the discussions were intense and the

confrontations volatile, 92.9% [26] of the bills were passed by
the Assembly.

Of the 28 measures, consisting of 14 duplicates,

the legislature amended 71.4% [20].

While this number outpaces

the amendment rates of Governor Baliles, it is comparable to
Governor Wilder's Finance package percentage {67.9%/19) from the
1990 legislative session.

This comparison illustrates that,
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- Table 8: Governor L. Douglas Wilder, 1993 Legislative Session:
Passage Rate: 90.6%

I

Amendment Rate: 55.1%

*Total Number of Bills Introduced:
*Number Introduced into the House of Delegates:
*Number Introduced into the State Senate:
*Number of Duplicate Bills:
Senate

House
- Number of Bills
Amended in House
of Origin Only
- Number of Bills
Amended in Second
House Only

Totals

21

I 25.6%

4

I 8.90%

25

I 19.7%

1

I 8.54%

9

I 20.0%

16

I 12.6%

20.1%

12

I 26. 1%

29

I 22.0%

I 11.0%

8

I 17.8%

12

I 9.45%®

I

- Number of Bills
Amended in Both
Houses Only

17

- Number of Bills
Killed

9

- Number of Bills
Continued

o I

- Total Number of
Bills Amended®

127
82
45
26

45

0.00%

I 54.9%

o I
25

0.00%

I 55.6%

o I
10

0.00%

I 55.1%

®: Total Number Amended calculated by adding the first three lines.

®: Number Decreases Because of Surviving Duplicate Bills
Source: 1993 Legislative Session Documents, Division of Legislative
Services Library

similar to Governor Baliles, Governor Wilder's initial and final
year box scores, defined as the percentage of bills amended,
passed, killed, and continued, did not significantly fluctuate.
These findings do not conform with the expectations of lame
duck theory.

The evidence reveals three important conclusions.

First, neither governor experienced a passage rate below 90%.
Second, while both chose to advance controversial legislation

Lame Duck Theory 24

- Table 9:
:Governor Wilder, 1993 Legislative Session:
*Breakdown of Executive Package:
Number of
Bills
Amended in
House of
Origin Only

Number of
Bille
Amended in
Second House
Only

Number of
Bille
Amended in
Both
Houses Only

Number of
Bille
Killed or
Continued

Total
Number of
Bille
Amended lit

Violent crime
(28 Bille)

2.36%

2.36%

11.0%

3.15%

15.7%

{ 3)

(3)

Economic Development (21 Bills)

4.72%

Public Safety
(16 Bills)

2.36%

(14)

(4)

( 2 0)

0.79%
(l)

0.79%
(1)

0.00%

6.30%

(0)

(8)

0.79%
(1)

1.57%

2.36%

4.72%

(3)

(2)

(3)

(6)

Health & Human
Resources (14 Bills)

3.94%

1.57%

0.00%

0.00%

5.51%

(5)

(2)

(0)

(0)

(7)

Finance
(12 Bills)

0.00%

0.79%
(l)

4.72%

3.94%

5.51%

(6)

(5)

(7)

Education
(10 Bille)

2.36%

0.79%
(l)

1.57%

0.00%

4.72%

(2)

(0)

(6)

Natural Resources
(8 Bille)

0.79%
(1)

1.57%

2.36%
(3)

0.79%
(l)

4.72%

(2)

Administration
(7 Bille)

0.009%

3.94%
(5)

0.00%

0.00%

3.94%

(0)

(0)

(0)

(5)

Transportation
(7 Bille)

3.156%

0.00%

3.94%

(0)

0.79%
(l)

0.00%

(4)

(0)

(5)

Ethics
(4 Bille)

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

3.15%

0.00%

(0)

(0)

(0)

(4)

(0)

12.6%
(16)

22.8%
(29)

(6)

(0)

(3)

Total: 19.7%
(25)

9.45%*
(12)

(6)

55.1%
(70)

Totals Calculated by Adding Number of Bills Amended in House of Origin,
Second House Only and Both Houses Only
*: Number Decreases Because of Surviving Duplicate Bills
Source: 1993 Legislative Session Documents, Division of Legislative
Services Library

®:

their final year in office (Baliles' Finance & Appropriations
package and Wilder's Violent Crime initiatives), a point when they
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- Table 10: Governor Wilder, 1993 Violent Crime Package:
Passage Rate: 92.86%

I

Amendment Rate: 71.4%

*Total Number of Bills Introduced:
*Number Introduced into the House of Delegates:
*Number Introduced into the State Senate:
*Number of Duplicate Bills:

14
14
14

Totals

Senate

House

28

- Number of Bills
Amended in House
of Origin Only

2 I 14.3%

l I 1.10%

3 I 10.7%

- Number of Bills
Amended in Second
House Only

2 I 14.3%

l I 1.10%

3 I 10.7%

- Number of Bills
Amended in Both
Houses Only

1

I 50.0%

14 I 50.0%

- Number of Bills
Killed

l I 1 .10%

3 I 21.4%

2

- Number of Bills
Continued

o I

o I

o I

- Total Number of
Bills Amended®

I 50.0%

0.00%

11 I 78.6%

1

0.00%

9 I 64.3%

I

1 .14%®

0.00%

20 I 71.4%

®: Total Number Amended calculated by adding the first three lines.

®: Number Decreases Because of Surviving Duplicate Bills
Source: 1993 Legislative Session Documents, Division of Legislative
Services Library

were theoretically assumed to be at their weakest, both witnessed
the passage of these proposals. Third, their box score ratios
remained remarkably consistent, with neither experiencing a
notable decline at the conclusion of their tenure.

In short, the

typical outcomes associated with lame duck theory simply did not
materialize during the legislative sessions.

Neither governor was

unable to build "a legislative bloc to support his program", nor
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did either watch as their power went "downhill in subsequent
sessions." (Ransome, 1982)

What then does this mean for lame duck

theory?

Alternative

Exp~anations

for Gubernatorial Success

It is obvious that the gubernatorial/legislative puzzle is
not as simple and clear cut as the lame duck theory would have us
believe.

On the contrary, while governors face distinctive

challenges during their final year in office, the analysis above
suggests that such challenges are not necessarily insurmountable.
Table 12 illustrates this point.

Therefore, we must now go beyond

the question of whether a governor can sustain his or her
executive success rates over the course of their tenure and ask
why some governors excel, consistently maintaining exemplary
executive success percentages, while others might fall
comparatively short.
A governor's ability to deal successfully with the state
legislature does not decline solely because they lack tenure
potential or because they lack formal powers over administration,
i.e. veto and budgetary power and appointive authority
(Schlesinger, 1972). Instead, several studies argue that one
reason governors do not succeed is that they "are apparently
personally incapable or disinclined to use those powers that they
do possess." (Sigleman & Demetrius, 1988, 158; see also Beyle,
1983; and Gross, 1989)

Since a "governor's relationship with and

success in dealing with the legislature often determines the
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- Table

12: Comparison of the First and Last Year

Controversial Initiative

Entire Package
Passage
Rate

Amendment
Rate

- Baliles and Wilder:

Bills
Amended in
Both
Houses

Passage
Rate

Amendment
Rate

Bills
Amended
in Both
Houses

Baliles
let Year

95.76%

49.2%

18.6%

97.44%

59.0%

20.5%

Bal ilea
4th Year

97 .14%

47 .1%

18.6%

100.0%

64.7%

11.8%

Difference

+l.4%

-2.1%

0.0%

+2.6%

+5.7%

-8.7%

Wilder's
let Year

94.26%

55.7%

17 .2%

100.0%

67 .9%

25.0%

Wilder's
4th Year

90.60%

55.1%

22.8%

92.86%

71.4%

50.0%

Difference

-3.6%

-0.6%

+5.6%

-7 .1%

+3.5%

+25.0%

success" of the administration, "fonnal powers do relatively
little to bolster a governor's influence where infonnal resources
and charisma are lacking." (Beyle, 1983, 206; see also Sigleman &
Demetrius, 1988, 157; and Gross, 1989)

Therefore, executive

success could dependon the governor's ability to utilize and
manage fonnal power in dealin9,S with the legislature. This skill
may be affected by the political environment and the particular
aspirations and skills each governor brings to the office.
Consequently, we should explore the hypothesis that personal
traits, characteristics and skills, the political environment and
future ambitions all effect the outcome of executive/legislative
relations.
Returning to the executives studied here, while there was
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some speculation to the contrary, Governor Baliles did not possess
the same future electoral ambitions as either Chuck Robb or
Douglas Wilder.

As a result, his behavior as governor lent itself

to collaboration and consensus, a style of leadership favored by
those who place the state agenda over personal objectives:
When Baliles took over, it was widely known that he did not harbor the
same ambitions as Robb, or, for that matter, Wilder. The possibility of
a future national appointment was not out of the question, but, for the
most part, we knew that he wanted to work for the state of Virginia with
the democratically controlled General Assembly. He looked upon the
Assembly as his partner. His equal. The primary goal of his
administration was to work with this partner to construct an agenda
geared towards improving the condition of the state, not furthering his
own political aspirations (Staff Interview, 2/9/93) .

This demeanor influenced Governor Baliles' dealings with the
legislature. During his administration, he took great care to
forge strong, personal relationships with the Assembly as a whole
and many of· its individual representatives and leaders.

To

facilitate these friendships, Baliles, a fonner member of the
House of Delegates, would often journey to the Assembly and
consult with individual legislators.

On other occasions, he went

out of his way to give them and their branch credit for
legislative accomplishments.

By

no means one dimensional, he was

also highly adept at the politics of provision, rubbing elbows,
massaging egos and granting perks and favors when
necessary.

Baliles' leadership style afforded the governor many

successes, yielding dividends during his final, and most trying
legislative session.
To summarize, faced with the difficulties that accompany the
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lame duck label, a factious Assembly, a short, odd-year
legislative session and a troubling fiscal forecast, Governor
Baliles was quick to narrow his agenda, focus his resources and
propose the legislation developed under difficult fiscal
conditions (Staff Interview, 2/9/93}.

Remarkably, despite the

fact that portions of his Finance and Appropriations proposals
divided the Assembly, his overall amendment rate decreased 2.1%
from 1986, his initial year in office, while his passage rate
remained consistent (See Table 12}.

To achieve these numbers,

Governor Baliles practiced the politics of cooperation and
compromise.
Governor Baliles• successor was elected into office at a time
when the political environment was tumultuous.

"With

controversies and crises looming on the budget and in
transportation, education, mental health, rural housing and
corrections," the new governor initially viewed his post with some
apprehension (Sabata, 1991, 96} .

But as the 1990 legislative

session began, Governor Wilder boldly decided to forego the
conciliatory techniques applied by his predecessor.

"Eager to

fashion a reputation as a fiscal conservative," a stance "clearly
linked to his presidential ambitions," (Eckholm & Hinds, Al, 1991}
and wary of appearing vulnerable during a period of economic and
political uncertainty, he instead chose to assert his own

~ower

and strength by introducing a series of controversial spending
cuts and demanding that the Assembly act on his proposals (See
also Harris & Tapscott, 1992; and Schapiro, 1990}.

By refusing to
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call for tax increases, he shrewdly thwarted G.O.P. attempts to
label him as a free spending liberal, silenced those Democrats who
felt that tax hikes were necessary but who faced reelection
battles in 1991 and unabashedly attempted to transform "fiscal
distress into a political asset." (Eckholm & Hinds, Al, 1991)

At

the end of the 1990 session, Governor Wilder had achieved a
laudable passage rate and national recognition for his fiscal
prudence, but his confrontational and somewhat self-serving stance
left many wondering if the new governor's loyalties were misplaced
(Associated Press, 1990; Eckholm & Hinds, 1991; and Hardy &
Schapiro, 1990.).
This first legislative session set the tone for the remainder
of his administration, one which witnessed an aborted presidential
bid, senatorial posturing for a possible 1994 Senate race and
public approval ratings which fluctuated between 34% and 48%
(Richmond Times Dispatch, Media Research Department) .
Furthermore, the mid-term Assembly elections reduced the
Democratic advantage by 10, from 61 to 59 in the House of
Delegates and 30 to 22 in the Senate (Whelan, 1993, 4).
Consequently, as his term progressed, the Assembly's increasing
partisanship combined with Governor Wilder's contentious
personality and leadership style to strain the congenial
gubernatorial/legislative relationship enjoyed by his predecessor.
Staff members routinely characterized him as a head of state who
felt that "he alone knew what was best for Virginia." (Staff
Interview, 2/9/93)

Once Governor Wilder proposed his executive
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package he felt that the legislative branch ought to implement
his proposals without question.

Those portions of his package

which furthered his own interests and received national attention,
like the 1993 Violent Crime initiatives, benefited from a more
flexible governor who deviated from his confrontational stance if
the move promoted the passage of the bill(s)
2/9 /93)

(Staff Interview,

.14

But, more often than not, the governor chose not to cooperate
and compromise, preferring to remain obdurate in the face of a
frequently less than amicable political environment.
Consequently, it should come as no surprise that while the
amendment and passage proportions achieved by Governor Wilder in
his initial and final years in off ice parallel each other (Table
12), a fact which undermines lame duck theory, his success rates
do not

equa~

those posted by Governor Baliles (Table 13).

- Table 13: Comparison, Baliles and Wilder - First and Last Year Averaged:
Entire Package

Controversial Initiative

Passage
Rate

Amendment
Rate

Bills
Amended
in Both
Houses

Passage
Rate

Amendment
Rate

Bills
Amended
in Both
Houses

Baliles,
1986 & 1989
(188 Bills)

96.5%

48.1%

18.6%

98.7%

61.8%

16.1%

Wilder
1990 & 1993
(249 Bills)

92.4%

56.1%

20.0%

96.4%

69. 6%

37.5%

14:

To this end, washington Post reporters John Harris and Donald Baker report
that Wilder's 1993 Violent Crime efforts ended in victory "according to
legislators because in the final year of his administration he did what
he steadfastly refused to do throughout the first three years: He
identified an issue well before the session, carefully cultivated public
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First, while Governor Wilder's passage rate for the entire
package is within 5.0% of that posted by Governor Baliles, his
amendment percentage exceeds his predecessor's by 8.0%.

Secondly,

and more significantly, a comparison of the controversial
initiatives advanced by each shows that Governor Baliles•
proposals sparked less negative legislative activity than did
Governor Wilder's.

Governor Wilder's amendment rate outpaces the

Governor Baliles' by 7.8%, while his percentage of bills amended
in both of the Assembly's houses is 37.5%, 21.4% greater
than Governor Baliles• 16.1%.

Therefore, while each was able to

overcome the constraints of their final year, Governor
Wilder's ability to gain the unrevised passage of his legislative
proposals lagged behind that of his predecessor.

These facts

suggest that executive success depends upon an assortment of
factors ranging from the personal skills, ambitions and agenda of
the executive to the political environment - the fiscal situation,
gubernatorial popularity, electoral results and the partisan
arrangement of the legislature.

Each of these factors, even

during the concluding year of an executive's term, affects the
passage and amendment rates of gubernatorial initiatives.

14:

support, then built a legislative majority through a mix of persuasion
and compromise. In short, Wilder performed more like a traditional
governor and less like a maverick outsider than in previous years. He
no longer seemed more intent on rattling the establishment and going it
alone than on affecting public policy." (Harris & Baker, 1993, Bl)
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Conclusion
All governors enter off ice and employ a particular strategy
to guide their actions:
To achieve their goals in the face of uncertainty, surprise, ambiguity,
inadequate information, and centrifugal forces, public executives
need .... a set of premises deliberately chosen to provide direction to
their thinking, choices and administrative behavior (Crew, 1992, 24).

Since "most studies of gubernatorial behavior focus on success in
achieving policy purposes and how the governor develops and uses
his or her political resources .... to achieve policy success", it
stands to reason that the premises governors generate are geared
towards dealing with the political environment and maximizing
their potential for present and, if applicable, future success
(Crew, 1992, 16).

How each governor implements and coordinates

these premises and objectives in the face of the structural and
environmental hurdles he/she faces throughout their tenure and,
especially, during their concluding year, is critical.

If a

governor proposes viable legislation, is comfortable with and
respected by the legislature, enjoys face-to-face negotiations
regularly and is the beneficiary of a relatively stable political
environment, we would expect his or her passage and amendment
rates to remain consistent.

Conversely, the head of state who

toils within a dynamic political environment, advances respected
but occasionally highly contentious policy proposals and who finds
it difficult to cooperate and compromise with the legislature
would be more likely to record passage and amendment percentages
which trail those posted by the executive delineated above and
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are, comparatively, less congruous.
These examples are a small sample of the myriad of
combinations of variables which can affect
gubernatorial-legislative relations and executive success rates.
If one elects to address the notion of what constitutes executive
success and, in doing so, contrasts the media's interpretations
with those offered by political scientists, the picture becomes
more muddled.

Journalists tend to pen event driven renditions

which focus on daily nuances, whereas political scientists seek to
discern the relative importance of these nuances within the
context of broader trends and general patterns of behavior.
Consequently, while the data reviewed above suggests that it may
be "inappropriate to fix a cycle of increasing or decreasing
policy effectiveness for governors" (Johnson, 1990, 359), it
neither

pu~orts

to off er the definitive word on the

executive/legislative relationships analyzed here nor adequately
explains why the success rates of Governors Baliles and Wilder
remained relatively constant. The main objective throughout has
been to show that discourse concerning lame duck theory needs to
begin anew.

Future examinations must account for and discuss the

correlation between success and personal.skills, environmental
considerations and future.political ambitions.

Such studies would

no longer be tempted to reduce the investigation of
executive/legislative relations to any one factor, being obliged
to address the dynamic interaction between a variety of variables.
This thesis illustrates that those studies are necessary if we are
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to move beyond the simple assumptions of lame duck theory and
provide a fuller explanation of gubernatorial success with state
legislators.
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